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Fast-gated avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are the most commonly used single photon detectors for
high-bit-rate quantum key distribution (QKD). Their robustness against external attacks is crucial to the
overall security of a QKD system, or even an entire QKD network. We investigate the behavior of a
gigahertz-gated, self-differencing (In,Ga)As APD under strong illumination, a tactic Eve often uses to bring
detectors under her control. Our experiment and modeling reveal that the negative feedback by the
photocurrent safeguards the detector from being blinded through reducing its avalanche probability and/or
strengthening the capacitive response. Based on this finding, we propose a set of best-practice criteria for
designing and operating fast-gated APD detectors to ensure their practical security in QKD.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.9.044027
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of secure
communication whose security is guaranteed by the laws of
physics and does not depend on any assumption of an
eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) computational power [1,2]. In its
implementation, semiconductor avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) are the most used single-photon detectors because
they can operate at temperatures obtainable by thermo-
electric cooling, or even at room temperature [3,4]. For this
reason, they have naturally attracted intensive scrutiny in
the QKD community [5]. The blinding attack, in particular,
has been demonstrated to be the most effective. Here, Eve
first shines bright light onto the receiver’s detectors, which
brings them under her control [6–8] and then uses a faked
state attack in an intercept and resend configuration, which
ensures that the receiver’s detectors click only when he
chooses the same basis as hers [9]. Under a favorable
setting [10], Eve can gain all information on the final key
without introducing a quantum bit error.
With advances in fast-gating techniques [11–17], APD
detectors can count single photons at gigahertz rates [18],
and their importance in QKD has grown considerably
[19–23]. Gigahertz-clocked self-differencing (SD) detec-
tors have enabled a secure key rate exceeding 10 Mbit=s
[24] and can support a communication distance over
200 km of fiber [25], while their robustness for real-
world deployment has been routinely proven in field
trials [26–28]. However, little scrutiny has been devoted
so far to the security of these fast-gated detectors, except a
recent study on a moderate-speed SD detector [29]. A set
of best-practice criteria for designing and operating these
detectors is still lacking, although an incorrectly designed
or ill-set detector will be guaranteed to bring vulnerability
into a QKD system [30].
All fast-gating techniques use high-frequency gating to
periodically switch on the detector for single-photon
detection, although they may differ in how the signal is
processed after optical detection, i.e., how the strong
capacitive response to the fast-gating signal is removed.
Here, we investigate the behavior of a gigahertz-gated SD
detector under strong illumination to gain insights into the
behavior of fast-gated detectors. While an appropriately
set detector shows resilience against blinding attacks,
we explore the detector parameter space where the device
becomes prone to blinding. Our analysis reveals that the
negative feedback by the photocurrent of a properly set
SD APD prevents the detector from being blinded, and
this conclusion is further supported by theoretical model-
ing. The feedback reduces the avalanche probability and
increases the detector capacitance, with a combined effect
that safeguards the detector from the blinding attacks. Our
findings enable us to propose a set of best-practice criteria
for designing and operating these detectors to ensure their
practical security in QKD.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The device under test is a fiber-coupled ðIn;GaÞAs=InP
APD which is thermoelectrically cooled to −30 °C and has*zhiliang.yuan@crl.toshiba.co.uk
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a breakdown voltage of 51.8 V. Generic electronics in the
form of a dc voltage source and pulse generator are used to
provide the SD APD with a constant dc bias of 51.6 V and
a 1-GHz square wave with a peak-to-peak amplitude of
4.6 V, respectively. This bias condition results in an excess
voltage of V0ex ¼ 2.1 V over its breakdown voltage. The
series resistance of the APD is measured to be 1.0 kΩ. A
variable quenching or biasing resistor is applied in the
biasing circuit for later convenience, and its initial value
is set to zero. A continuous-wave distributed-feedback
C-band laser is used to illuminate the APD, and the output
is amplified by two 20-dB amplifiers before being mea-
sured using a 16-GHz oscilloscope. The overall experi-
mental setup is given in Fig. 1(a).
Under fast gating, an APD produces a strong capacitive
response which can be much stronger than the avalanche
signals arising from photon detections. To suppress such a
response and enable photon detection, the SD circuit splits
the output of the APD in half, shifting one of those halves
by a gating period and then recombining the two halves in
order to cancel the strong capacitive response of the
detector [12]. Figure 1(b) shows a typical waveform of a
SD output, with an avalanche signal rising above the
residual, uncanceled background of the detector capacitive
response. It is important to choose an appropriate discrimi-
nation level that rejects the residual capacitive background
while accepting photon-induced avalanches with a maxi-
mal probability. Figure 1(c) shows the detector efficiency
and dark count rate as a function of the discrimination level.
The dark count rate shows a kink at the discrimination
level of 16 mV, indicating the threshold above which the
dark avalanches have replaced the capacitive residuals to be
the dominant contribution to the measured dark count rate.
While we could use this level, we set the discrimination
level about 10% higher at 18 mV in order to have a
tolerance margin. The detector is measured to have a single-
photon detection efficiency of 26% for pulsed light and a
dark count rate of approximately 23 kHz for this discrimi-
nation level. Setting a higher discrimination leads to a lower
detection efficiency and dark count rate. More detrimen-
tally, doing so can also favor blinding, as we show later, and
therefore goes against the best practice of using SD APDs.
III. SD APD UNDER STRONG ILLUMINATION
Gated APDs are often simplified as a binary detector;
i.e., their avalanche amplitude is independent of the number
of photons that triggered it [31]. Under such a simplifica-
tion, a SD detector’s count rate (fC) can be written as
fC ¼ fð1 − PclickÞPclick ¼ fe
−μηð1 − e−μηÞ; ð1Þ
where Pclick is the probability of an avalanche being
generated, f is the gating frequency, μ is the photon flux
per gate, and η is the probability that a photon initiates a
macroscopic avalanche.
Equation (1) highlights the nature of the self-differencing
circuit, which requires an avalanche to be followed by no
avalanche in order to be registered as a count. If two
subsequent counts occur, then the cancellation effect causes
one of them not to be counted. If Pclick ¼ 1, then every gate
contains an avalanche and they all cancel each other out,
resulting in a count rate of zero. Therefore, under blinding
conditions, we expect a count rate of zero when μη ≫ 1,
translating to a blinding power of about 100 nW for
the current detector under continuous-wave excitation; see
Fig. 2 (the dashed line). This blinding power is 3 to 4 orders
of magnitude lower than that required for conventional gated
APDs [6], and this finding has lead to the concern that such
intrinsic imperfection threatens the security of a high-bit-rate
QKD system using SD detectors [29].
To examine this prediction, we subject our detector to
continuous-wave illumination from the laser diode.
Figure 2 shows the detector count rate as a function of
the incident optical power for various discrimination levels.
We first look at the result obtained with the appropriate
discrimination level of 18 mV. In the weak illumination
regime (≤ 10 nW), the detector behaves like a typical
single-photon detector. Its count rate is initially dominated
by dark count noise, then increases linearly due to a
FIG. 1. (a) Setup for characterizing the self-differencing de-
tector under bright illuminations. LD, laser diode; VOA, variable
optical attenuator; SD, self-differencer; Rq, quenching resistor.
(b) A SD output waveform showing a single avalanche rising
above the capacitive response residual. (c) Detection efficiency
and dark count rate as a function of the discrimination level.
18 mV is marked as our chosen appropriate discrimination level.
A. KOEHLER-SIDKI et al. PHYS. REV. APPLIED 9, 044027 (2018)
044027-2
detection of incoming photons before saturation at about
4 nW. Beyond saturation, the detector exhibits a count-rate
plateau between 10 nW to 2 μW, while Eq. (1) predicts an
immediate, sharp drop in the count rate. When the optical
power is greater than 2 μW, the count rate starts to fall
noticeably because of the SD cancellation between neigh-
boring gates. However, the fall only creates a shallow dip
with a local minimum of 21.4 MHz at approximately
0.23 mW. We do not observe detector blinding, i.e., the
count rate falling to zero, for incident power up to 7 mW.
By increasing the discrimination level, both the detection
efficiency and the saturation count rate become lower, as
a higher discrimination level rejects a larger fraction of
self-differenced signals. More strikingly, the count-rate dip
becomes deeper. At 26 mV, the detector registers a zero
count rate with an incident power between 0.1 and 2.5 mW.
The existence of this blinding gap makes Eve’s blinding
attack feasible, and this result leads to an unsurprising
conclusion that an inappropriately set SD detector is
vulnerable, just like its low-speed counterparts [30]. We
note that the minimum blinding power is still more than 3
orders of magnitude larger than that predicted by Eq. (1).
To understand the origin of the discrepancy, we perform
another experiment by varying the resistance value of the
quenching resistor in the dc path of the detector biasing
circuit. While use of a quenching resistor is common for
free-running APD detectors [32], it is unnecessary for gated
APDs because an avalanche is automatically quenched
after a detection gate. Figure 3(a) shows the count-rate
dependencies for different resistance values together with
that obtained without a quenching resistor. Here, we choose
to use the ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV to enhance
the blinding effect. A blinding gap exists for all resistance
values, but the gap shifts to lower power regions as the
resistance value increases. With 400 kΩ, the blinding power
is just 100 nW, which is 3 orders of magnitude lower than in
the 0 kΩ case.
Figure 3(b) shows the measured detector photocurrent
(the dashed lines) as a function of the incident optical
power. Flowing through the resistive components, includ-
ing both the quenching resistor and the APD itself, the
photocurrent creates a voltage drop and therefore lowers
the detector reverse bias; see Fig. 3(b) (the solid lines).
This voltage drop has two direct effects. First, it reduces
the avalanche probability (η). The higher the incident
power, the lower the excess bias and avalanche proba-
bility. This outcome explains why the detector requires a
much higher optical power to become blinded than that
expected from Eq. (1) and the formation of the count-rate
plateau. Second, it lowers the avalanche signal amplitude
and, consequently, the differential signal between adjacent
detector gates. A larger quenching resistor makes the
detector excess bias drop faster, as shown in the following
equation:
Vex ¼ V
0
ex − IR; ð2Þ
where V0ex is the excess bias under dark conditions, I is the
photocurrent, and R is the total series resistance, including
both the intentional quenching resistor and the internal
series resistance of the detector. The larger the value of R,
the smaller the required photocurrent to reduce the excess
bias, Vex, to zero, which results in an earlier blinding.
The voltage drop corresponding to blinding is marked in
Fig. 3(b) with empty squares.
A third effect caused by the photocurrent can explain the
count-rate recoveries shown in Fig. 3(a). We mark in the
figure the voltage values corresponding to the recovery point
after each blinding gap with an empty circle. The voltage
FIG. 2. Detector count rates as a function of incident optical
power from a continuous-wave C-band laser diode with different
discrimination levels. The variable quenching resistor is set to
0 Ω. The dashed line represents Eq. (1) with a constant η ¼ 0.028
for continuous-wave illumination.
FIG. 3. Detector behavior with different quenching resistor
values. (a) Detector count rates as a function of the incident
optical power at an ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV. (b) Mea-
sured photocurrents and calculated voltage drop in the detector
bias. The same color codes are used in (a) and (b) to represent
different quenching resistor values.
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drop values are all around 5 V. This observation provides
a key to understanding the count-rate recoveries, as we
explain here. A SD circuit suppresses the detector capacitive
response but will always leave a residual background due to
its finite performance. The amplitude of such background is
proportional to the APD capacitance [see Fig. 1(b)], which
depends on the thickness of its depletion layer that is reverse-
bias dependent [33]. A voltage drop leads to an increase in
the capacitance and hence the amplitude of the residual
background, which eventually overcomes the discrimination
level and revives the counting rate. This explanation agrees
with the count rate reaching 1 GHz for all quenching resistor
values; see Fig. 3(a).
To provide further support to this argument, we measure
the APD capacitive amplitude under dark conditions before
the SD circuit as we reduce the dc bias applied to the
device. As shown in Fig. 4, we find that, at the point of
recovery, the response increases in amplitude by 25% of its
original value, where there is a bias reduction of 4.5 V. This
quantity of bias reduction can be realized using 2.3 mW of
optical illumination for the case of the biasing resistor being
set at zero. Because of the imperfect cancellation of the SD,
the increased capacitance of the APD translates to a larger
background after the SD circuit. This measurement result
also justifies our choice of the appropriate discrimination
level as being only 10% above the capacitive background
(see our previous discussion), as this level can easily be
overcome by such a dramatic increase in the residual
capacitive signal. We note that the measured increase of
the capacitive signal is applicable to all fast-gated APDs
[11–17].
With both sides of each blinding gap accounted for, it is
natural to understand the gradual disappearance of the
blinding gap when lowering the discrimination level
(Fig. 2). In a “blinding” gap, the SD output signal is made
up of two components with opposing trends. The differ-
ential output of the SD circuit becomes smaller as the
incident power increases because each detector gate is more
likely to produce an avalanche with a saturated amplitude
or the amplitude itself is reduced by the lowered excess
bias. Concurrently, the residual capacitive background
gains strength due to the reduction of the APD reverse
bias. The latter can overcome an appropriately set dis-
crimination level before the photon-induced signal falls
completely under.
The above explanation is distinctively different from the
gain modulation that has prevented conventional gated
APDs from blinding [30]. Although still present, the modu-
lation of the photocurrent by detector gating is periodical
and considerably weaker than the capacitive response, and
therefore its contribution to the self-differencer output is
negligible. Laser intensity fluctuations can also produce
self-differencing signals that can overcome a detector dis-
crimination level at high illumination power, particularly
when pulsed optical excitation is used [29]. However, this
mechanism does not play the dominant role in our case
using continuous-wave illumination. First, it is incompatible
with our observation in Fig. 3 that the recovery power can
vary over 3 orders of magnitude for the same detector and
blinding laser, with the lowest recovery power being merely
2 μW. Second, the intensity fluctuation should produce a
maximum count rate that is half of the gating frequency,
while we observe a maximum count rate of 1 GHz.
IV. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
We perform a Monte Carlo simulation to reproduce the
experimental observation shown in Fig. 2. For each APD
gate, we compute its avalanche current (i1; i2; i3;…) and
then determine the current difference between neighboring
gates (Δn ¼ in − in−1). Together with the capacitive
residual background (σSD), this differential current repre-
sents the self-differencing output, and we compare the
value of Δn þ σSD against the discrimination level (δ) to
decide whether a gate produces a count. In the simulation,
we take into account the negative feedback of the photo-
current. This effect lowers the avalanche probability, which
is related to the excess voltage described in Eq. (2). This
reduced excess bias increases the capacitive residual σSD,
which is a result of the reduction of the APD’s charge layer
depletion. The photon-number-dependent [34] avalanche
amplitude that is saturated at a high photon number is also
accounted for.
Figure 5 shows the Monte Carlo simulation results using
the above model and a typical set of parameters (see the
caption), with the exception of various discrimination
levels. For comparison, we replot the experimental data
(the symbols) showing a blinding gap and obtained with
a 26-mV discrimination level, as well as the analytical
calculation (the dashed line) for a binary detector using
FIG. 4. APD capacitive response measured before the self-
differencing circuit as a function of the dc bias reduction below its
normal value. We mark the point corresponding to the count-rate
recovery as shown in Fig. 3.
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Eq. (1) with a constant η. We are able to see that the
Monte Carlo simulation successfully reproduces the exper-
imental observations. First, the simulation confirms the
detector blinding at a high discrimination level and the
subsequent count recovery due to the increased capacitive
response. Second, it replicates the blinding power being 3
orders of magnitude higher than expected for the binary
detector. Finally, the blinding gap disappears with lower
discrimination levels and the count-rate dip becomes
shallower. Although the simulation is based on a simple
and intuitive model, it confirms again the effects of negative
feedback on the detector photocurrent.
Having understood the effect of the negative feedback of
the photocurrent, we can reliably discuss the impact of
Eve’s blinding attacks on self-differencing detectors. To
succeed in blinding attacks, Eve has to blind all single-
photon detectors in a system, i.e., each of them registering
zero or finite count rates that are negligible when compared
with that expected by the legitimate QKD users. To keep
hidden, her attack must not introduce detectable changes.
It is fair to say that an Eve using the same equipment as we
use, i.e., a continuous-wave laser at 1606 nm with 1-GHz-
clocked semiconductor SD APDs, achieves neither when
SD detectors are appropriately set. As shown in Fig. 2,
Eve’s attack laser produces a count rate exceeding
10 MC=s, comparable to the state-of-the-art raw key rates.
At the same time, Eve’s attack produces a detectable
photocurrent on the order of 1 mA, thereby underlining
that correctly set SD detectors are resilient to a certain type
of blinding attack.
V. BEST-PRACTICE CRITERIA
We propose below a list of best-practice criteria to be
followed in either designing or operating self-differencing
detectors to mitigate blinding attacks.
(a) Monitor the photocurrent. The blinding current is still
on the order of 1 mA, which can easily be sensed using
a resistor of 1 kΩ.
(b) Avoid use of a quenching or biasing resistor of high
resistance value because it can provide overly strong
feedback to the excess bias and therefore severely limit
the maximum count rate. We recommend a value less
than 50 kΩ when a biasing resistor is desired to limit
the current for protecting the APD detector. This
resistance value still allows a maximum count rate
of over 30 MC=s and has a negligible effect on the
QKD key rate.
(c) Set an appropriate discrimination level. Doing so not
only gives an optimal detection efficiency but also
enables protection by sensing the excess voltage
reduction through the residual capacitive background.
(d) Use different resistance values in a QKD system that
contains more than one detector. A careful choice
of resistance values can prevent an overlap of the
detectors’ blinding gaps (see Fig. 3) when their
discrimination levels are inadvertently ill set.
(e) Verify whether the capacitive response residual can
overcome the detector discrimination level when the
APD’s reverse bias is lowered below its breakdown.
If not, detune the self-differencing circuit slightly
and/or reset the detector discrimination level.
(f) Model the behavior of the detector, as in Fig. 5, to
ensure that it behaves as expected in the protected
environment of a laboratory.
Compliance with the above criteria does not introduce a
significant increase in system complexity or a reduction in
the secure key rate. This is an advantage as compared with
the countermeasure of monitoring the detector efficiency
[35], which offers a higher level of assurance, but at the
expense of the system simplicity and key rate. We note that
the applicability of the proposed criteria is not limited to SD
detectors but extends to other types of high-speed gated
APD detectors, as discussed earlier. They can all improve
their resilience from the negative feedback of the photo-
current, despite their use of different signal cancellation
techniques.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we experimentally study and theoretically
model in this paper the behavior of an (In,Ga)As self-
differencing detector under bright illumination from a
continuous-wave laser. We show that the intrinsic, negative
FIG. 5. Monte Carlo simulation results (the solid lines) of the
detector count rate as a function of incident optical power with
different discrimination levels. Experimental data for a 26-mV
discrimination level is shown for comparison. The dashed line
shows the expected count rate for a binary detector, i.e., an APD
with a constant avalanche probability and an avalanche amplitude
that is photon-number independent. Parameters are Vex ¼ 2.1 V,
RAPD ¼ 1 kΩ. σ
0
SD ¼ 0.64, and ηð0Þ ¼ 0.028. The discrimina-
tion levels shown in the figure and σSD are in units of I0, which is
the average current of single-photon-induced avalanches in the
absence of a noticeable photocurrent.
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feedback of the photocurrent prevents not only an early
blinding but also a complete blinding at very high attacking
powers by strengthening the residual capacitive back-
ground. We show the importance of setting an appropriate
discrimination level, as doing so has a direct impact on the
detector’s behavior under Eve’s blinding attack. Our find-
ings allow us to outline a set of best-practice criteria to
ensure the most secure conditions to operate these detectors
in QKD systems.
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